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Abstract:  We calculate the expected distributional effects of the European 
Emissions Trading System combining industry and household-level data. By 
combining data on direct CO2 emissions by production sector from the German 
Environmental Account with the German Input-Output Accounts, we calculate the 
CO2 intensity of each sector covered by the EU ETS. We focus on the impact of price 
increases in the electricity sector, both directly in the form of higher electricity bills for 
consumers and indirectly through products that use electricity as an input to 
production. Distributional effects of price increases are analyzed on the basis of the 
German Income and Expenditure Survey for the year 2008 data and updated to 
2013. We confirm the ex-ante expected regressive effect, which is, however, both 
rather small in magnitude and can be offset and even more than offset by revenue 
recycling, in particular the reduction of social security contributions on labour income.  
 
 
Acknowledgement:  The authors would like to thank Regina Betz for her valuable input and 
advice. 
_______________________ 
1 University of New South Wales  (UNSW), j.cludius@unsw.edu.au,  
2 German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin),  mbeznoska@diw.de 
3 Free University Berlin, viktor.steiner@fu-berlin.de 
1 
 
1 Introduction  
Even though the Climate Summit in Durban of 2011 merely kept the door open for 
further negotiations regarding the adoption of a new global climate treaty, pollution 
control policies already are a reality in Europe and around the world. In order to 
reach the goal of reducing emissions by 20% below 1990 levels until 2020 the 
European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has been introduced and been 
operational since 2005 (European Union, 2003).  
Since the price of permits increases the cost of production for emissions-
intensive industries, such as electricity generation or the manufacture of glass and 
paper, consumer prices are likely to rise as a consequence. While this is indeed 
desirable, since it induces a shift away from polluting goods to less energy-intensive 
ones, concerns have been raised as to whether those price increases might 
predominantly hurt low-income households, since they spend a larger fraction of their 
income on emissions-intensive products than high-income households.  
While this effect has been confirmed in the literature, researchers have noted 
the possibility to alleviate potential adverse distributional effects by way of revenue 
recycling. Metcalf (1999) who models a revenue-neutral green tax reform in the U.S. 
finds that while the burden of the environmental tax is distributed regressively, the 
whole reform is much less so and can even be rendered progressive by targeting 
low-income families. In their analysis of a 15% decrease in carbon emissions by way 
of an emissions trading system in the U.S., Dinan and Rogers (2002) compare both 
efficiency and equity effects of a system where those permits are given out for free to 
one where they are auctioned and the revenue returned either as a cut to corporate 
taxes, payroll taxes or as lump-sum transfers. They come to the conclusion that 
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unless the government auctions most of the permits, and returns them in equal lump-
sum transfers, this policy is highly regressive and note the trade-off between using 
revenues to increase efficiency of the tax system and using them to alleviate 
regressivity. Burtraw et al. (2009), who model a hypothetical emissions trading 
system in the U.S. with a price of $21 per ton of carbon in 2015, find that returning 
revenue in the form of per capita lump-sum transfers to households, especially if 
these are taxable, makes the policy progressive. The same is true if revenues are 
returned as an expansion of the personal income tax credit. A reduction of the 
income tax and payroll tax, albeit favoured for efficiency reasons, exacerbates the 
regressivity of an emissions trading system. In their recent study of a domestic 
emissions trading system in Canada, Araar, Dissou and Duclos (2011) combine a 
general equilibrium model with stochastic dominance analysis to assess its impact on 
welfare and inequality under three different policy instruments: an output-based 
allocation of permits, revenue recycling in the form of lower payroll taxes and 
revenue recycling in the form of lower consumption taxes. While they find that 
inequality increases under all three scenarios as compared to the base case, they 
report rather modest effects, which are significant for the output-based allocation and 
reduction in payroll taxes and insignificant for the reduction in consumption taxes. 
Studies have also been carried out for European countries. Baker and Köhler 
(1998) who study the effect of excise duties used to cut emissions by 10% in eleven 
EU member states, find that this policy is weakly regressive if revenues are used to 
reduce employers’ taxes, but becomes strongly progressive if revenues are 
distributed lump-sum. Modelling a hypothetical CO2 tax of €20/tCO2 for Ireland, 
Callan et al. (2008) also find that the initial effect is regressive, but that households 
across the income distribution can be made better off, if revenues are partly passed 
3 
 
back to them. They implement different forms of recycling the revenue, such as an 
increase in social security payments, an increase in the personal tax credit, or a 
reduction of the tax rate and note that the increase in social security payments is the 
most progressive of the options. In their study of the Danish CO2 tax  Wier et al. 
(2005) find that it is regressive (especially its direct component) and even more so 
than other Danish levies, such as the value added tax (VAT). They note the 
importance of family size and regional differences. Brännlund and Nordström (2004) 
consider a doubling of the Swedish CO2 tax, where revenue is returned in form of a 
lower VAT or a subsidy to public transport. They find that the reform is regressive, 
but point out that regional differences are more important than differences in income. 
Bach et al. (2001) carry out a broad-based analysis of the German environmental 
fiscal reform of 1999, which increased taxes on fossil fuels and electricity and in turn 
lowered social security contributions (SSC). As part of a larger fiscal reform, income 
tax and child benefits were also adjusted. Overall, they find only moderate effects. 
When taken in isolation, the introduction of the environmental tax is regressive, 
looking at the whole reform package, most households are better off than before the 
reform. Interestingly, there exist a number of studies for European countries 
(Labandeira and Labeaga 1999 for Spain; Tiezzi 2005 and Martini 2009 for Italy; 
Symons et al. 2002 for five European countries), which find that carbon taxes in 
those countries are not necessarily regressive, even before revenue is returned to 
households. 
Although the effects of a carbon tax are often comparable to those of an 
emissions trading system, as a cornerstone of European environmental policy, the 
European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) merits differential analysis. We are 
not aware of any study to date explicitly modelling the impact of the EU ETS on 
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households in a European member state using real world data. As the EU ETS is due 
to enter its third phase in 2013, such an analysis seems warranted, as this will be the 
first phase during which a large amount of emission permits will be auctioned rather 
than given out for free, thus presenting European governments with the opportunity 
to alleviate unwanted distributional effects by way of revenue recycling.1  
This paper contributes to the empirical evaluation of the expected distributional 
effects of the EU ETS by combining industry and household-level data for Germany. 
We focus on the impact of price increases in the electricity sector, both directly in the 
form of higher electricity bills for consumers and indirectly through a whole range of 
products that use electricity as an input in production. For our analysis, we combine 
industry- and household-level data in order to calculate the expected distributional 
effect of the EU ETS on German households, as described in the next section. Our 
simulation results confirm the ex-ante expected regressive effect the EU ETS has on 
households. However, the initial regressive effect is both rather small in magnitude 
and can be offset and even more than offset by revenue recycling, in particular the 
reduction of social security contributions on labour income. We conclude that the 
different options for recycling revenue from auctioning permits should be considered 
when assessing the adverse distributional effects of the EU ETS. 
2 Data and Methodology 
We obtain direct CO2 emissions per production sector from the German 
Environmental Account (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010a). Combining this 
information with the German Input-Output Accounts (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2010b), we are able to calculate the CO2 intensity of each sector covered by the EU 
                                                            
1 During this third phase, for the first time, a substantial share of emissions permits is auctioned: more than 50% 
as compared to only 4% during the second trading period (2008-2012) (European Commission, 2010b, 2010c). 
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ETS2 and predict the percentage price increase for all sectors following an assumed 
average carbon price of €25 during Phase 3 of the EU ETS,3 both directly incurred by 
installations covered by the EU ETS and indirectly by sectors using CO2 intensive 
goods as an input to production. Both data sets reflect emissions and industry 
structures for the year 2007. The production sectors are then aggregated to 25 
groups of consumption goods, such as electricity, food and beverages and clothing. 
Consistent with the literature, we assume perfectly elastic supply and hence 100% 
cost pass-through to consumers.4 
We focus on the impact of price increases in the electricity sector, both directly 
in the form of higher electricity bills for consumers and indirectly through a whole 
range of products that use electricity as an input to production. The rationale for 
focusing on the electricity sector is twofold. First, the electricity sector is responsible 
for 65% of emissions under the EU ETS. It is the only sector, which has to buy 100% 
of the permits from 2013 onwards. Other sectors, such as iron, steel, cement, lime 
and glass, are still granted free allocation on the basis that they might be susceptible 
to international competition and are not expected to be able to pass-through the full 
cost of carbon (European Commission, 2010a).5 This assumption is also consistent 
with revenue-neutrality of the policy: The full burden incurred by households through 
price increases via the EU ETS is recycled back to them. Otherwise one would have 
                                                            
2 The EU ETS covers around 50% of European CO2 emissions and around 12,000 individual installations in the 
energy and most industrial sectors, 1,700 of which are located in Germany. Installations covered include power 
stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories producing 
cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. In 2012, aviation will come under the scheme and 
from 2013 onwards petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminum will also be covered, as well as the capture, 
transport and storage of CO2. 
3 Even if earlier price forecasts for EU ETS permits (European Commision, 2008) have recently been revised 
downwards, an average price of €25 during the third trading period seems reasonable (Point Carbon, 2011) and 
has also been used in other studies (Löschel et al., 2011). 
4 This assumption might overstate regressivity, which is reduced if some of the incidence is passed back to 
factors of production (Metcalf et al., 2010). 
5 Additionally, we assume that the aviation sector will be able to pass costs forward to consumers, as all air travel 
into and out of the EU is covered by the scheme. 
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to infer how households would compensate for the burden imposed on them over 
and above the amount of revenue recycled.6 
Figure 1    Percentage price increase for 25 groups of consumption goods 
 
Figure 1 details percentage price increases for the 25 consumption groups. With an 
increase of 14% the effect is most pronounced for household consumption of 
electricity,7 followed by the air travel sector, which is also expected to pass on the 
costs of compliance to consumers. To put this results into perspective, it should be 
noted that in 2007 already 20% of the electricity price consisted of environmental 
taxes, and a further 16% of the value added tax (VdEW Baden-Württemberg, 2007). 
                                                            
6 Please refer to the Appendix for sensitivity analysis of the impact, where this assumption is relaxed and all EU 
ETS sectors pass costs forward to consumers. 
7 The price increase might in fact be even more pronounced as electricity prices are determined according to 
marginal plant (Matthes, 2008), which, in Germany, is an emissions-intensive, coal-fired power plant. At the same 




For all other sectors the price increase following the EU ETS is in the range of 
inflation.8  
The German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2011) is an administrative data source and contains detailed information on income 
sources and expenditure patterns of households, as well as information on other 
sociodemographic characteristics, such as social status and age of the household 
members. The Survey is published every five years and households are observed 
one quarter reporting individual income and household level expenditures. We use 
2008 data and update the monetary variables including consumption spending 
patterns to 2013. For this purpose, we pool the waves 1998, 2003 and 2008 and run 
regressions on sociodemographics and time trends.9 Table I shows average 
expenditure and income for the households included in the EVS. Using expenditure 
as a proxy for lifetime income  (cf. Poterba 1991), we sort households into equivalent 
expenditure deciles. 
We estimate the first-round effects of the EU ETS on German households under 
the assumption of a permit price of €25 by calculating the percentage increase in 
expenditure necessary to retain the consumption level of all 25 groups of 
consumption goods. The calculation of first-round effects takes into account both the 
direct effect on household expenditures incurred through a higher price for electricity 
and the indirect effect through consumption of products that use electricity as an 
input to the production process, but does not account for substitution and income 
effects induced by changes in the relative prices of consumption goods. 
                                                            
8 A household’s use of motor fuels and gas and oil for heating purposes are not covered by the EU ETS but 
subject to alternative measures in the EU.  
9 We also considered updating the industry-level data set to 2013. However, assumptions on the development of 
emissions and economic activity for all 72 sectors included in the German Input-Output Tables would have been 
necessary. As these two variables might well decouple to some extent during the next years, using 2007 data 
seemed to be favourable for consistency reasons. 
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Table I    Average monthly expenditure and income of net equivalent 









1 924 1300 60 
2 1271 1807 68 
3 1508 2209 69 
4 1736 2592 70 
5 1945 2877 73 
6 2153 3152 75 
7 2414 3527 78 
8 2709 3890 80 
9 3202 4527 85 
10 5149 5729 94 
    





3 First-Round  Effects 
Figure 2 shows first-round effects, divided into the direct effect of the increase in the 
price of electricity and the indirect effect on other goods. As can also be seen from 
Table II, the total impact of the EU ETS on German households is clearly regressive. 
This result is driven by the regressive effect of direct electricity consumption, while 
the indirect effect is distributed progressively, a result that has previously been noted 
in the literature (Bull and Hassett, 1994; Casler and Rafiqui, 1993; Hassett, Mathur 
and Metcalf, 2009). Affecting less than 1.1% of household expenditure for all deciles, 
the overall effect is fairly moderate. 
Figure 2 Initial impact of the EU ETS on German households, as % of 
household expenditure 
 
Figure 3 further illustrates this result by calculating impacts in monetary terms for 
different household types. On average, German households face additional costs of 
€16/month. Looking at the share of expenditure affected, we see that the effect is 
roughly proportional for all household types, although somewhat larger for single 
women and singles with kids.  
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Total Impact Electricity Indirect 
1 1.09% 0.92% 0.17% 
2 0.95% 0.77% 0.18% 
3 0.84% 0.65% 0.19% 
4 0.78% 0.58% 0.20% 
5 0.74% 0.54% 0.21% 
6 0.72% 0.50% 0.21% 
7 0.68% 0.46% 0.22% 
8 0.66% 0.43% 0.23% 
9 0.64% 0.39% 0.25% 
10 0.53% 0.28% 0.25% 
    





Figure 3   Monetary impact of EU ETS on selected household types 
 
As our analysis does not incorporate behavioural change on the part of the 
household and therefore implicitly assumes price elasticities of zero for all 
consumption goods affected, it is best suited for a short-run view and small price 
changes and can serve as an upper bound to the estimation of the impact. This is 
also consistent with the assumption that only the electricity and aviation sectors will 
be able to pass through the costs of carbon in the short term. Neglecting behavioural 
effects can lead to overestimation of the regressivity of the policy (West and Williams 
2004). However, it could be argued that since we are using 2008 data (and then 
further updating it), this data set could already incorporate a behavioural response to 
the EU ETS, since households might already have reacted to the EU ETS, which has 
been running since 2005 (cf. Wier et al. 2005 who use a similar argument for the 
Danish CO2 tax). The effect on the expenditure for electricity would be twofold: The 
share would be smaller since households have reduced their consumption of 
electricity. The share (in monetary value) would be larger, since electricity has 
already become more expensive. These two effects might well be counteracting. 
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4 Role of Revenue Recycling 
In this section, we return the revenue obtained by the German government through 
the auctioning of emissions allowances via lump-sum rebates and as a reduction in 
social security contributions (SSC). The estimated yearly revenue is €7.5 billion, 
equivalent to the amount of permits the electricity sector requires times a carbon 
price of €25.10 With this amount we are able to reduce the social security 
contributions rate by 0.8 percentage points or provide a lump-sum transfer of 94€ per 
person in the household.11 As a point of comparison, as a result of the environmental 
fiscal reform, the German government generated revenues of roughly €17 billion per 
year (€9 billion from households directly and another €8 billion from industry) and 
was able to reduce SSC by 1.6 percentage points (Deutscher Bundestag, 1999). 
Figure 4 shows the impact the EU ETS has on German households if all of the 
revenue is recycled back (i) as lump-sum rebates (ii) as a cut in the rate of social 
security contributions. Both measures reduce the impact of the reform on German 
households significantly, but while the lump-sum rebate makes the EU ETS 
progressive, a reduction in social security contributions retains the regressivity of the 
policy. Table III details the impacts as a percentage of household expenditure along 
the equivalent expenditure deciles. In case revenues are fed back as lump-sum 
rebates, lower income deciles gain from the EU ETS, while for a reduction in social 




10 Löschel et al. (2011) estimate auctioning revenues in 2013 of €6.4 billion rising to €8.1 Mio billion. Therefore, an 
average auctioning revenue of €7.5 billion seems reasonable. 
11 The case for targeted revenue recycling schemes rather than revenues being absorbed by the general budget 
can be made on the basis that it is likely to increase public support for the policy in question (see, for example, 
Kallbekken, Kroll and Cherry, 2011, who derive this result in their experiments). 
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Figure 4    Impact of the EU ETS and revenue recycling on German households, 
as % of household expenditure 
 
 
This result hinges on the fact that social security contributions are deducted from 
work income. Therefore, a reduction in the rate of social security contributions does 
not benefit those households that do not have employment income. These 
households are usually located in the lower deciles of the income distribution. At the 
same time, an upper threshold for social security payments exists, which implies that 
the impact is relatively smaller for those households earning more than this 
threshold, typically in the high income deciles. Finally, the self-employed do not 









Net impact after 
lump- sum rebate 
Net impact after 
reduction in SSC 
Gross impact 
1 -0.41% 0.65% 1.09% 
2 -0.28% 0.31% 0.95% 
3 -0.23% 0.07% 0.84% 
4 -0.19% -0.07% 0.78% 
5 -0.12% -0.11% 0.74% 
6 -0.06% -0.14% 0.72% 
7 -0.01% -0.16% 0.68% 
8 0.06% -0.15% 0.66% 
9 0.14% -0.09% 0.64% 
10 0.23% 0.08% 0.53% 
 
 
Table IV displays inequality measures before the EU ETS, for the gross impact 
without revenue recycling, and for the net impacts after a lump-sum rebate and a 
reduction in social security contributions respectively. Inequality is highest in the 
cases of no revenue recycling and can be reduced by both forms of revenue 
recycling. After recycling as lump-sum rebates, inequality is even reduced compared 






Table IV Inequality measures for the impact of the EU ETS with revenue 
recycling (using equivalent weights) 
 












Gini 0.2612 0.2620 0.2602 0.2617 
Theil 0.1233 0.1241 0.1224 0.1235 
GE(1) 0.1134 0.1142 0.1123 0.1142 
GE(2) 0.1628 0.1639 0.1616 0.1627 
 
Although the recycling of revenue in the form of a reduced rate of social security 
contributions does not seem to alleviate the regressive nature of the EU ETS as 
much as lump-sum rebates do, this form of revenue recycling may have the 
additional benefit of reducing existing distortions elsewhere in the taxation system. 
This trade-off between efficiency and equity considerations has previously been 








Figure 5   Impact of the EU ETS and revenue recycling on different age groups, 
as % of household expenditure 
 
Other dimensions exist, along which distributional effects of a policy can be 
assessed. As Figure 5 shows, older people in Germany are particularly impacted by 
the EU ETS. They spend a relatively large share of their expenditure on goods 
affected by price increases through the EU ETS and do not gain as much from 
rebates. Especially if revenues are distributed as reductions to social security 
contributions, one can see the “pensioner effect,” i.e. as 65 is the official retirement 
age in Germany, most of those people do no longer contribute to the social security 
system and hence to do not benefit from the rate reduction. However, Parry et al. 
(2006) also note that indexed transfer payments, such as social security benefits, will 
adjust if the price of consumption goods increases as a reaction to emissions trading, 
however, further research is needed in order to assess if this compensates for a 
substantial amount of the price increase. 
Finally, looking at the impact the EU ETS has on people of different social 
status, Figure 6 shows that a reduction in social security contributions favours civil 
servants, employees, and workers. If revenues are returned in a lump-sum fashion 
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nearly all groups are, on average, compensated for the impact caused by higher 
prices, except for the retirees, who again, seem to be particularly disadvantaged. 
Figure 6   Impact of the EU ETS and Revenue Recycling on people of different 
social status, as % of household expenditure 
 
In December 2010 the German government passed a law setting up a new Energy 
and Climate Fund, which will receive most of the proceeds generated through the EU 
ETS auctions and will be used to finance national energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects and international climate protection measures in accordance with the 
German Energy Concept (BMWI and BMU, 2010). Although the German 
environmental fiscal reform, which was enacted in 1999, was used to finance a 
decrease in the rate for social security contributions and proposals in the U.S. 
(Metcalf, Marthur and Hassett, 2010) and Australia (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2011) 
include elaborate household assistance, the German government has not formulated 
any such plan for the EU ETS revenue. Using the revenue for clean energy and 
climate protection measures, as is envisaged by the German government, does not 
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directly impact the income of households. Whether the benefits of such a policy 
accrue to low- and high-income households alike is a point of disagreement  (see 
Fullerton, 2008, for an overview of the possible effects).13 However, if those spending 
programmes were targeted directly at low income households, e.g. via energy 
efficiency schemes, the initial regressive effect could also be offset.  
5 Conclusion 
The potentially adverse distributional effects of pollution control policies in general 
and the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in particular have received 
an increasing amount of attention during the past years. The ability to address those 
concerns will be material in shaping climate policy in the future.  
We confirm the ex-ante expected regressive effect the EU ETS has on 
households. However, the initial regressive effect is both rather small in magnitude 
and can be offset and even more than offset by revenue recycling on the government 
part. This result puts into perspective concerns about adverse distributional effects of 
the EU ETS and should be taken into account when assessing the different options 
for revenue recycling of auctioning revenues from the EU ETS. To date, the German 
government has not announced clear plans of how the EU ETS revenue will be 
recycled. While using the auctioning revenue to fund climate protection measures 
seems reasonable, some of the revenue could indeed be used to offset adverse 
distributional effects and to improve the efficiency of the taxation system, thereby not 
only reaping additional benefits, but also making the policy more attractive to the 
public as a whole.  
                                                            
13 Furthermore, as Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux (2003) point out, in order to fully assess implications of a more 
specific plan to recycle revenue for the income distribution among households, it is crucial to take account of the 
pre-existing distortions in the taxation system. 
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Overall, governments should (in keeping with considerations about the 
competitiveness of businesses), maximize auctioning revenue, so as to retain 
flexibility to use it in order to improve the efficiency of the taxation system and 
achieve distributional aims. Furthermore, the higher the price of emissions, the higher 
the auctioning revenue and the larger the opportunities for the government to use it 
to address distributional concerns. While the government cannot and should not 
influence the price of carbon directly, stringent emissions caps or price floors provide 
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis  
For this sensitivity analysis, we assume that all sectors covered by the EU ETS pass 
the full cost of carbon forward to consumers (and not just electricity and aviation 
sectors). The literature, in accordance with economic theory, assumes that the 
allocation methodology is indeed irrelevant for the rate of cost pass-through. Even if 
emissions permits are given out for free, they represent assets that could be sold if 
they would not have to be held to cover an installation’s emissions. A firm is expected 
to add the opportunity cost of the forgone alternative use (i.e. selling of permits) to its 
production costs (Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen, 2006). 
Figure 7  Sensitivity analysis of percentage price increase in 25 groups of 






As Figure 7 shows, the price increase for electricity is still by far the largest, also in 
this sensitivity scenario. Therefore, conclusions regarding the impact of the EU ETS 
on consumers remain very similar to the above analysis. As Table V and Figure 8 
show the overall effect is now larger, while the regressive nature of the total effect 
and the progressive nature of the indirect effect remain. However, in this setting, 
where only part of the burden imposed on households is obtained by the government 
in the form of auctioning revenue, companies are expected to generate considerable 
windfall profits. Parry (2004) who approximates the impact of those windfall profits on 
the income distribution by looking at share holdings across income deciles, 
concludes that in such a setting emissions permits that are given out for free are 
especially regressive. 
Figure 8  Sensitivity Analysis of initial impact of EU ETS on German 
Households as % of expenditure (assumption: all EU ETS sectors pass costs 





Table V Sensitivity analysis of initial impact of EU ETS on German 
Households as % of expenditure (assumption: all ETS sectors pass costs 




Total Impact Electricity Indirect 
1 1.12% 0.92% 0.20% 
2 0.98% 0.77% 0.22% 
3 0.88% 0.65% 0.23% 
4 0.82% 0.58% 0.24% 
5 0.79% 0.54% 0.25% 
6 0.76% 0.50% 0.25% 
7 0.73% 0.47% 0.26% 
8 0.71% 0.43% 0.28% 
9 0.69% 0.39% 0.29% 
10 0.59% 0.28% 0.31% 
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